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ABSTRACT
We present CloudVal, a framework to validate the reliability of virtualiza-
tion environment in cloud computing infrastructure. A case study, based on
injecting faults in the KVM hypervisor and XEN hypervisor, was conducted
to show the viability of the framework. The study shows that due to the
architectural differences between KVM and XEN, a direct comparison of the
two virtualization systems is not feasible. In order to confidently weigh error
resiliency of virtualization systems, more comprehensive studies are required.
We believe, however, that the fault injection approach and the fault mod-
els proposed in this thesis are a good starting point towards designing and
implementing a benchmark which would enable the assessment of different
virtualization infrastructures in a common manner.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Cloud Computing: Growing Trend of Interest and
Reliability Challenges
Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm in the IT industry with many
large enterprises, such as IBM, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, participat-
ing as cloud providers. It is a paradigm adopted by an increasing population
with dynamic computing requirements. According to the research firm Gart-
ner [1], Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) – one type of cloud-based service – grew
18% from $6.4 billion in 2008 to $7.7 billion in 2009, and this trend will per-
sist through 2013. For customers, the cloud is viewed as a potential solution
to replace costly in-house server farms and self-managed data centers. Paying
for computing resources on an as-needed basis is the feature that differen-
tiates cloud computing from traditional IT infrastructures. This mitigates
the risk of over-provisioning or under-provisioning in IT management. These
advantages promise the stable growth of cloud computing.
However, providing a higher level of availability is one of the major chal-
lenges [2] that cloud computing needs to address in order to attract more
customers. Customers who have migrated their services to a cloud should
not have to encounter problems such as Amazon’s S3 outage (7/20/2008)
due to a single bit error in the gossip message [3], Google AppEngine’s par-
tial outage (6/17/2008) due to a programming error [4], Microsoft Azure’s
outage (3/13/2009) for 22 hours due to the malfunction in the hypervisor [5],
or the case where data was lost due to a system failure in Microsoft Sidekick
service [6].
Figure 1.1 is an image from Google Insight for Search showing the in-
creasing attention to cloud computing from 2007 to 2011. Along with the
increasing trend of interest, we use the dots to mark the publicly reported
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Figure 1.1: The growing trend of cloud computing (from Google Insight for
Search)
outages that occurred during this time period. The data was collected from
three major cloud providers: Amazon, Microsoft and Google. The glowed
dots are the major outages, some of them are highlighted above. Chapter
5.1 describes in details several outstanding outages.
1.2 The Need for a More Effective Testing for Cloud
Computing Infrastructures
Approaches involving the use of multiple providers [2] or running several
instances [5] are typically not preferred by either cloud service providers or
cloud customers. Therefore, cloud providers need to seek better solutions to
gain the confidence of their customers and, conversely, customers need to see
evidence of high reliability and availability in the services they purchase. A
desirable long-term solution is to have (i) a highly reliable implementation for
every single instance of a dynamically provisioned (possibly virtual) machine,
(ii) an effective monitoring and real-time management of the problems, and
(iii) a rigorous testing process for cloud deployments. In this solution, testing
plays an important role in evaluating the performance and error resiliency of
the services offered by the cloud.
In addition to traditional testing techniques (which mainly focus on func-
tional testing), fault injection is widely recognized as an effective way to
(i) study the complex interactions between faults and fault-handling mecha-
2
nisms, (ii) assess the efficiency of protection mechanisms, and (iii) quantify
system/application availability and/or reliability [7, 8]. Fault injection tech-
niques can create failure scenarios for which normal testing techniques do
not usually account, such as hardware transient faults, perturbations in the
operating system (OS), or drivers.
1.3 CloudVal Approach
In this research, we focus on assessing the reliability of cloud’s virtualiza-
tion infrastructure given that virtualization plays an important role as the
enabling technology behind the growth of cloud computing. In fact, most
clouds use virtual machines (VMs) as an integral part of their core archi-
tecture. To name a few, Amazon’s EC2 is powered by XEN hypervisor,
Microsofts Azure uses Windows Azure Hypervisor (WAH) as the underlying
infrastructure, and an IBM cloud offering includes a version of the Kernel-
based Virtual Machine (KVM). Virtualization technology facilitates dynamic
partitioning and sharing resources in the cloud, leading to better resource
utilization, and flexibility based on dynamic workload migration, etc.
We present CloudVal, a software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI)
framework to automate the process of conducting fault injection-based ex-
periments for black box testing and reliability evaluation of virtualized en-
vironments. The framework supports injecting not only basic fault models
such as soft errors, but also more complex fault models such as fault mimick-
ing delayed I/O operations or maintenance events. Moreover, the design of
the framework allows new fault models to be implemented and easily added
to the experimental suite.
As a case study, the framework is applied to characterize error behavior
of two experimental cloud environments: (i) a KVM hypervisor [9] based
cloud and (ii) a XEN hypervisor [10] based cloud. Virt-manager [11] is used
as the management system of both clouds. Note that to gain insights into
XEN’s error behavior, we combine the results from our experiments with
the findings reported in [12]. KVM and XEN hypervisors are chosen for this
study because both are open sources. Having access to the source code allows
us to conduct an in-depth interpretation of the measurements.
The key contributions of this thesis are:
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• Implementation of a framework to inject different types of faults (e.g.
maintenance faults, performance faults) using debugger-based tech-
niques. The design is extensible to add other fault models.
• A proposed set of representative fault models, including soft error, guest
system misbehavior, performance faults, and maintenance faults, to
evaluate the virtualization system.
• Demonstration of the proposed framework as a viable method to test
and evaluate error behavior of KVM and XEN virtual environments,
and the libvirt-based management system.
The proposed fault injection framework and the fault models are a good
starting point toward designing and implementing a reliability benchmark
which would enable the assessment of different virtualization infrastructures
in a common manner.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the
overview of the CloudVal framework; Chapter 3 shows how the framework is
used to evaluate KVM and XEN hypervisor-based clouds; Chapter 4 discusses
important observations from the experiments and a further discussion on the
implication of the results; Chapter 5 further motivates our thesis by surveying
the related work; and finally Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
FAULT INJECTION FRAMEWORK
We extended the NFTAPE fault injection framework [13] to support injecting
various types of fault models. We call the new framework CloudVal.
Figure 2.1: CloudVal components
The extended framework consists of four components: Control Host, Pro-
cess Manager, Data Extractor, and Fault Injector. Figure 2.1 illustrates this
structure. The Process Manager, the Data Extractor, and the Fault Injector
reside on target machines, which run target programs or the target operating
systems. The Fault Injector is in charge of inserting fault to the software
system of the target machines. In order to do that, it is implemented as an
integral software component (i.e., a kernel module) of the target machines.
The Process Manager creates a communication channel between the Fault
Injector and the Control Host. The Control Host, which often resides on
a separate machine called Control Host Machine, is interactively controlled
by users to (1) specify fault injection targets, (2) create fault injection cam-
paigns, and (3) automatically conduct fault injection experiments. The Data
Extractor is a new improvement of CloudVal compared to NFTAPE. This
component allows CloudVal to create a much more user-friendly interface for
the users. Specifically, the Data Extractor is capable of translating symbolic
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information, such as a variable’s name or a function’s name, input by the
users to low-level target machine-specific information, such as register names
or virtual addresses.
The next sections provide further details of each component.
2.1 The Injector
Our Injector uses a technique called breakpoint-based injection. This is a a
Software Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI) technique that takes advan-
tage of the debugging feature in modern processors to perform fault injec-
tion with low performance overhead. The basic idea of the breakpoint-based
technique is using hardware debug registers to set breakpoints in target ap-
plications under execution. When a target program reaches a breakpoint,
the injection code is executed to insert errors to the target program.
This technique has several advantages, namely (i) it allows a target pro-
gram to execute at full speed until the breakpoint location is reached; (ii)
neither source code instrumentation nor re-compilation is required for the
target program, allowing the evaluation to be conducted on the same system
as it is deployed in the field; and (iii) the injector executes in the kernel
context, thus, it has access to a wide range of targets, from kernel space to
application space.
The breakpoint-based injector component is implemented as a loadable
kernel module on Target Machines. Using the debugger-based technique,
the Injector is responsible for (i) setting each triggering location as a break-
point location, and (ii) injecting the fault when the breakpoint location is
reached. A processor debug register is used to set the breakpoint, and the
fault injection code is implemented in the breakpoint interrupt handler. The
breakpoint determines when to inject the fault; and the breakpoint interrupt
handler (the injection code) determines how to inject the fault.
This design gives the injector both the required capabilities as well as
the extensibility. On the one hand, the injection code executes, as part of
the kernel, and hence, can access the entire kernel address space, the user
address space of every running process, and the physical registers available
to the operating system. On the other hand, using the basic breakpoint
triggering mechanism, the injector can be extended to support new fault
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models by adding new injection code to the breakpoint interrupt handler
(see Secion 3.2 for the descriptions of different fault models implemented in
the Injector).
2.2 The Control Host
Figure 2.2: NFTAPE Control Host GUI overview
The Control Host is implemented as a Java program running on Control
Host Machines. It provides a GUI interface for the end user to (i) specify the
parameters of the experiment, (ii) generate a script to automate the exper-
iment based on the parameters provided, (iii) execute the script to perform
the experiment, and (iv) log the data that is the output of the experiment.
The Control Host communicates with the Process Manager through a TCP
connection to control the experiment and collect the experimental data from
the target machine.
7
Table 2.1: Control Host GUI’s Components
Component Support for Users
Project Browser
Pane
Manage target programs and target machines
Target Browser
Pane
Display target application structure to enable users to se-
lect injection locations (e.g., global function, global variable,
class members, etc.)
Workspace Pane Create custom fault models
Edit Campaign
Script Tab
View and edit the auto-generated campaign script
Injection Loca-
tion View Pane
Display the created injection locations
Output Pane Display logging information during experiments running
2.2.1 Control Host GUI Overview
Table 2.1 describes Control Host GUI’s components. The two most important
components are the Target Browser pane and the Workspace pane. The
Target Browser pane allows users to view the symbolic structure of target
program and/or target operating system. Users can also select the injection
locations (e.g., a function or a local variable) directly from this pane. The
Control Host obtains this information from the Data Extractor. See Section
2.4 for further details on how the Data Extractor obtains this information.
The Workspace pane allows users to create custom faults. There are two
areas in this pane, the upper area is to specify injection locations, such as
trigger locations and injection locations. A trigger location is a location in
the target program, where the execution of this location will trigger the fault.
For example the trigger location is the first instruction of a function, when
this function is called, the fault will be injected. An injection location is a
location in the target program, to which the fault will be injected to. For
example the injection location is a local variable, when the trigger location is
reached, this local variable will be corrupted as specified by the fault model.
The fault model is created in the lower area of the Workspace pane. In this
area, users need to specify how the fault should be performed. For example,
a fault model would corrupt one single bit (as the soft error model presented
in Section 3.2.1) in the injection location, or simply just delay the execution
of the triggered thread for a pre-defined amount of time (as the performance
fault presented in Section 3.2.3).
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2.2.2 Experiment Parameters
The experiment parameters include:
Target object: provides information about the target machine and the
target software. The target machine is identified by its IP address and port
number on which the Process Manager listens. The target process (executing
the software) is identified by its location in the target machine. The target
process can be a user process (e.g., VM or an application) or the operating
system. Control Host uses this parameter to create connection to the target
machine.
Number of injections: the number of injections that the Control Host
needs to generate for the experiment.
Trigger location: a trigger can be located within a function or specified
by a range of addresses within the code segment or data segment of the target
object.
Injection location/object: specifies the location where the fault should
be injected. An injection location can be given as a memory address, a
register, or an offset from a base register.
Fault model: specifies the fault type to be injected. It can range from
bit-flips and value overwrite, to thread hang and processor on/off.
2.2.3 Automation Scripts
The script generated by the Control Host describes a finite state machine, as
shown in Figure 2.3, for running the injection experiment in an automated
way. It describes the actions to be taken to initialize the experiment, perform
the injection, verify the injection result, and repeat this process until all the
specified injections are performed.
2.2.4 General Usage of Control Host
The purpose of the Control Host GUI (referred to as GUI hereafter) is to help
the user manage the injection targets, specify parameters for the injector,
create and execute the injection campaigns, and collect the injection result.
This is closely related to the steps the user goes through to perform evaluation
of a target application/system using NFTAPE. The steps for conducting an
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Figure 2.3: Campaign script state machine
evaluation include (1) specifying injection targets, (2) designing campaigns,
(3) running injection campaign and (4) analyzing logged information. In the
following, we explain the purpose of each step.
Step 1: Specifying injection targets
The first step in creating an injection campaign is to provide the GUI
with the information about the target system and target application. The
information is specified in the Target Browser tab of the GUI and includes
the IP address or hostname of the target system, the type of target system
platform, the location of the target application, and the location of the verifier
(if one is available). Based on this information, the GUI extracts information
about the target application (e.g., function/variable address) and the target
system (e.g., network devices), and displays them on the GUI to assist the
user to specify the injection locations in the next step. The target application
and target system information can be saved to a target profile for the later
use.
Step 2: Designing injection campaign
The second step is to tell the GUI WHEN the fault should be triggered,
WHERE the fault should be injected, and HOW to perform the corruption.
First, the user designs the campaign by selecting the injection locations
(WHEN and WHERE information), and the fault model (HOW information).
GUI provides interfaces for the user to specify this information in the Create
Injection tab in the Workspace pane. Under the Create Injection tab there
are four sub-tabs which correspond to four types of injection TEXT, STACK,
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DATA, and REGISTER. The detailed functionality of each sub-tab will be
explained in the next sections.
Second, the user requests GUI to generate the campaign. A campaign
contains (1) a campaign script and (2) an injection command list.
(1) The campaign script defines the precise activities that automatically
execute a fault-injection experiment. It defines the sequence of steps, and
data, needed to run a specific experiment. This includes the various timing,
scheduling, and dependency constraints that determine the execution of a
typical experiment.
The model used in structuring the progress of a campaign is that of a
state machine. At any given moment, the campaign is in a single unique
state. This state, in turn, reflects the current state of all processes involved
in the experiment. State transitions occur when an event of significance to
the current campaign happens. Such an event might be the report that a
particular process has started executing, that it has terminated, or that it
has crashed.
(2) The injection command list is automatically generated by GUI based
on the injection locations and fault models that the user has specified in the
previous step.
Because the target application resides on the target machine, GUI needs
to invoke the Data Extractor module, which also resides on target machine
to extract the requested information, such as breakpoint addresses. The rule
of the Data Extractor module is to search within the given range (“whole
program” or “a specific function”) and randomly picks the breakpoints that
meet the user’s requirements. Text injection requires that selected break-
points must correspond to an instruction. Stack injection requires that in-
structions at selected breakpoints must access memory in the stack (note:
access here means both read and write; “memory accessed” could be any lo-
cation on the stack, not only the target location). Register injection requires
that instructions at selected breakpoints must access the target register.
Step 3: Running injection campaign
Select “Run campaign” button to start the campaign.
Step 4: Analyzing log information
The first part of the log file contains the summary of the campaign. The
second part contains the information about the activities of NFTAPE during
the time the campaign is running. Each message line has the same form as:
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Inj # {number} [Run #{number}] (Timestamp){sys/out/in}{message}
The following message elements are defined:
• Inj # {number}: the sequence number of the current injection
• [Run #{number}]: the sequence number of the running campaign
• (Timestamp): timestamp of the current message
• {sys/out/in}: the source and destination of the message
– sys means this is an information message generated by GUI
– out means this is the command that GUI sends to target machines
– in means this message is a return message from target machines
to GUI
2.3 The Process Manager
The Process Manager is a daemon running on the Target Machine which is
responsible for (i) executing the commands received from the Control Host
on the Target Machine and (ii) passing the experimental data back to the
Control Host. The Process Manager is automatically started at boot time
to allow the Control Host to communicate with it when the injected faults
cause the target machine to crash and reboot.
2.4 The Data Extractor
The injector, which operates as an interrupt handler, can only understand
the low-level description of locations, e.g., virtual addresses or register base
addresses. In order to inject faults at precise timing and location on high-
level programming language objects, the user has to manually calculate the
mapping from source-code-level locations to binary-level addresses. More-
over, recent computer architectures and compiler optimization techniques
allow an object to change its location throughout its lifetime; this makes
location calculation a non-trivial task.
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Responding to this drawback, we add the Data Extractor component to
CloudVal to allow the user to create injection experiments from the source-
code-level abstraction, providing, for example, capability to select local vari-
ables for a particular function. Specifically, the Data Extractor uses debug-
ging information to automatically derive injection timing and location, so
that the user does not have to deal with this semantic gap between high-
level and binary-level descriptions.
2.4.1 Debugging Information
Figure 2.4: Example of the DWARF tree structure of entries
Debugging information is designed for debuggers to coordinate with com-
pilers. A compiler generates information in a format that is understandable
by a debugger. The debugger then uses this information to provide develop-
ers features such as setting breakpoints at the source code level and printing
values of local variables at the time of a breakpoint triggered.
Among debugging formats, DWARF is a mature standard and widely sup-
ported by major compilers (e.g., GCC) and debuggers (e.g., GBD). DWARF
is designed as an architecture-independent standard to support a variety of
procedural languages, such as C, C++, FORTRAN, and Modula2.
DWARF represents the structure of an executable file in a tree of Debug-
ging Information Entries (DIE). Figure 2.4 depicts the DIE tree structure of
a simple application, which consists of compilation unit (simple app.c). This
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compilation unit owns a main() function, which is described by the follow-
ing set of attributes: name (DW AT name), return type (DW AT type), code
range address (DW AT low pc and DW AT high pc) and location of stack base
pointer (DW AT frame base). Function main() has two child nodes describing
two local variables lv and plv.
DWARF location descriptions hold locations of program objects. In the
above example, the DW AT location attribute describes the location of the lv
variable, which is DW OP fbreg:−10. This description means the address of lv
is a -10 byte offset from the stack frame base pointer. Tracing back to the par-
ent node, the stack frame base pointer is described as the DW AT frame base
attribute of the main function. The attribute value DW OP breg4 8 means
the stack frame base pointer is an 8 byte offset from the register 4 (in IA32 ar-
chitecture, reg4 is the ESP register). Combining these descriptions gives the
address of the lv variable, which is -2 (accumulation of all offsets: 8+(-10))
byte offset from the reg4 register.
2.4.2 Integrate DWARF to CloudVal Framework
Figure 2.5: CloudVal workflow with DWARF components (shaded color)
The process of conducting a fault injection campaign is demonstrated in
Figure 2.5. An executable file when compiled with the debug option con-
tains several debug sections in binary form. Our DWARF Parser processes
these sections to form a condensed DWARF data structure. A GUI tool is
developed to import this data and construct a tree that represents the target
program structure.
The Control Host GUI allows the user to visually select triggering condi-
tions/locations and injection locations. A trigger location can be a specific
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instruction, a lexical block, a function or the whole code segment. A trig-
ger condition allows the user to specify more precisely when the injection
is triggered. For example, a trigger condition can be a specific instruction
type, a read/write operation on a specific data object, or when a certain data
object matches a certain value. These selected locations are then translated
to virtual addresses to form the injection commands. Inject commands are
batched into a campaign script. The campaign script automatically invokes
the injector to inject each fault.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT WITH VM AND XEN
HYPERVISOR BASED CLOUDS
In this experiment, we apply CloudVal to study the behavior of (i) KVM-
based and (ii) XEN-based clouds in the presence of injected faults. Virt-
manager is used as the monitoring and management system of both clouds.
The goal is to evaluate the failure isolation mechanisms, the maintainability,
and the completeness of the implementation of the two hypervisors and the
management system.
Specifically, this chapter describes the experiment in the following five
steps:
• Step 1: Analyzing the target system to understand its high-level
architecture: what the main components of the system are and how
they interact to each other; specifically, Section 3.1 analyzes the archi-
tectures of KVM and XEN hypervisors - the subjects of our experi-
ments.
• Step 2: Selecting candidate fault models for each component
based on the understanding about the target system gained from the
first step; the selected fault models need to be representative and imple-
mentable by software fault injector. Specifically, Section 3.2 describes
four fault models that we use in the experiments, namely soft error,
guest system misbehavior, performance fault, and maintenance fault.
• Step 3: Performing pre-injection analysis to identify the trigger-
ing and injecting locations within each component for each fault model.
This is an important step to ensure the efficiency of each injection: max-
imize the activation rate of the fault. Since we want to evaluate the
system in the actual execution scenarios, the set of identified locations
usually associates with a certain set of input or workload for the sys-
tem. Specifically, we apply two injection strategies: stress-based and
path-based fault injections.
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• Step 4: Setting up the experiment involves creating an experi-
mental environment that mimics the actual deployment of the system
under evaluation. One of the important factors of this environment
is the workload, which is used to exercise the system during the fault
injection experiment. This workload also needs to be representative
for the typical workload in operational system. Specifically, Section 3.3
describes the KVM and the XEN experimental environments used in
our experiments.
• Step 5: Analyzing the experiment result is the final step that
involves processing the logged data of the injection tool. The next
chapter, Chapter 4, is dedicated to present our analysis.
3.1 Experimental Clouds
3.1.1 KVM-Based Cloud
The experimental cloud on which the experiments were conducted is built
on the KVM hypervisor included with the Redhat Enterprise Linux (RHEL)
5.4 distribution (Linux kernel version 2.6.18-164.el5). Virt-manager 0.6.1, an
open source virtual machine management tool developed by RedHat based
on libvirt API, was used as the management system. Virt-manager sup-
ports basic virtual machine administrative operations, such as provisioning
of VMs, modifying VM configurations, cloning VMs, installing guest OSes,
and monitoring resources online. A single virt-manager instance can manage
multiple hypervisors across physical machines.
3.1.1.1 The KVM Hypervisor
KVM (the Linux Virtual Machine Monitor) is a kernel extension, which, after
loading, turns the Linux kernel into a virtual machine monitor or hypervisor.
Figure 3.1 depicts the KVM architecture. The hypervisor consists of a
KVM kernel module and one qemu-kvm user process for each VM (or guest
system). The KVM kernel module leverages hardware virtualization provided
by recent x86 processors (e.g., Intel VT and AMD-V), to emulate virtual
17
Figure 3.1: KVM architecture
CPUs (vcpu). This module is also responsible for entering the guest mode
and handling memory management of the VM. After entering the guest mode,
the guest code, including both the guest OS and the guest applications, is
executed natively, rather than using emulation or binary translation, until it
needs I/O access or receives incoming interrupts. In KVM architecture, all
IO operations are forwarded to user mode, which is the hardware emulator
qemu-kvm. A qemu-kvm handles all the I/O accesses of a VM. This is
a multi-threaded process, which creates one thread for each vcpu and one
thread to simulate other devices such as a NIC (network interface card)
controller and disk controller.
3.1.1.2 Fail-Stop Model of KVM
In a cloud environment, the providers often do not control the user’s workload
running in the guest VM. However, they need to take care of the software and
hardware layers running below the guest OS. In this case, they are qemu-kvm
processes, the KVM kernel module, the host OS, the management system,
and the physical hardware. Ideally, a failure should not propagate (i) from
guest mode to user mode or kernel mode; (ii) from user mode to kernel mode
and (iii) from hypervisor to the management system.
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Figure 3.2: XEN architecture in hardware-assisted virtualization (HVM)
3.1.2 XEN-Based Cloud
This experimental cloud is built on XEN hypervisor 3.0, which is included
with the RHEL 5.4 distribution, and Virt-manager 0.6.1.
A XEN virtualization system is powered by the XEN hypervisor, which is
the most privileged software layer operating right on top of the hardware.
On top of the XEN hypervisor, one or more guest operating systems can
be hosted. After the hypervisor boots, it automatically loads the first guest
operating system (Dom0). Dom0 has special management privileges with
respect to other VMs, called DomU. By default, Dom0 has direct access to
the physical hardware.
In order to separate the mechanism and policy, XEN hypervisor exports
control interface to Dom0. Application-level management software running
in Dom0 utilizes this interface to manage the system’s resources. For exam-
ple, xenstored is used to store information about the domains during their
execution and to create and control domU devices. In order to support the
unmodified guest OS, XEN also uses a customized version of qemu (qemu-
dm) to simulate virtual hardware. Similar to KVM, each VM is coupled
with one qemu-dm process running in Dom0. In the context of this thesis,
XEN hypervisor and the user-application management software are the tar-
gets for fault injection based analysis. Figure 3.2 depicts XEN architecture
in hardware-assisted virtualization (HVM) mode.
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Table 3.1: Soft Error Fault Model
Fault Description Example
Bit flip Flip single or multiple
bits
Flip one bit of original value
0xabcdef98; new value is
0xabcdefb8
Add Increment/decrement
value of the target
Increment the original value
0xabcdef98; new value is 0xabcdef99
Swap Interchange the lowest
bits and highest bits of
a byte or word
Swap the byte of the original value
0xabcdef98; new value is 0xef98abcd
Overwrite Write a specific value to
the target
Write 0x00000001 to target memory
NOP Write NOP instruction
to the target in code
segment
Original instruction is 0xabcdef98;
new value is 0x90909090
3.2 Fault Models
The following description introduces fault models selected for this experi-
ment. For each fault model we discuss the real situation mimicked by the
fault, the rationale behind its selection, and the implementation of the fault.
3.2.1 Soft Error
This fault model mimics soft or transient errors occurring in memory, reg-
isters, or execution and control units of the CPU. The error is represented
as a single-bit or multiple-bits flip. Table 3.1 details the types of soft errors
supported by CloudVal.
3.2.1.1 Rationale
Soft errors are well-known phenomena caused by “glitches” in semiconductor
devices that occur mainly because of radiation particles (e.g., alpha particles
and atmospheric neutrons, which are by-products of cosmic rays) and power
spikes during system operation. The problem tends to worsen since the error
rate increases when manufacturers reduce the voltage and the memory cell
size but increase the memory speed and capacity of each new generation of
memory technology. Current memory technologies have been embodied with
Error Correcting Code (ECC) to detect and correct soft errors. However, the
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standard hamming ECC is only able to correct single-bit errors (SEC) and
detect double-bit error (DED) due to the substantial space overhead (23.4%
for 64-bit triple bit correction).
3.2.1.2 Implementation
The injector sets a breakpoint at the target process, such as the qemu-kvm
process as specified by the user. When the breakpoint is triggered, the injec-
tion code first removes all the breakpoints to avoid repeating the injection,
then corrupts the target object (a register or a memory location). Table 3.1
lists all the data corruption actions that the user can select.
3.2.2 Guest System Misbehavior
This fault model mimics the misbehavior of the guest system which may
lead to system state corruption or CPU exceptions. Ultimately this unusual
behavior could result in crashing or hanging the target guest system.
3.2.2.1 Rationale
This fault model is used as a black box testing of the failure isolation between
the guest system and the host system. All failures ideally should be confined
within the target guest system.
3.2.2.2 Implementation
A modified version of the injector is installed as a kernel module in the guest
OS to inject this type of fault. As a kernel module, the injector can identify
the current running process in the guest system and then:
• randomly corrupt a state of a process: flip one or multiple bits in
data, stack, code or register of that process; or
• raise a CPU exception: the exception is randomly chosen from
among MCE (machine check exception), divide by zero, and invalid
instruction.
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3.2.3 Performance Fault
This fault model mimics the situation where one or more threads are expe-
riencing delay due to the blocking during I/O access, CPU exhaustion, or
being interrupted by events, such as a scheduling event.
3.2.3.1 Rationale
The central idea behind a VM is to abstract the hardware of a single physical
machine for sharing between many guest OSs. However, if accesses to these
shared resources are not properly synchronized, it may result in race condi-
tions, which eventually cause unexpected system behaviors. In addition, due
to the time-dependent and non-deterministic nature of the problem, detect-
ing this type of bug is difficult, though it is important.
Since a race condition is timing sensitive, it is more likely to be exposed
in high load situations. For instance, one class of race condition bugs is the
time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) flaw. This flaw is more likely to
be exposed if the TOCTTOU is prolonged because of, for example, a heavy
workload. Therefore, this fault model is specifically designed to exercise the
implementation of the hypervisor in the situation where several threads are
blocked at a certain point for a certain period of time.
3.2.3.2 Implementation
First, the user specifies a breakpoint address, a number of threads to be
injected, and a delay time. The injector then sets a breakpoint at the given
address in all running threads of the target program. When the breakpoint is
triggered in a thread, the injector removes the breakpoint in that particular
thread to avoid repeating the fault injection step in the same thread. Note
that the breakpoints in other threads are still kept active. After the given
number of threads are triggered, the injector removes the breakpoint in all
the threads to make sure that fault is injected only to those specific threads.
The injection code, after being triggered, simply puts the thread to sleep for
the given delay time.
For example, the injector inserts 52 seconds of delay in three threads when
executing the third instruction in the ioctl() function, the virtual address
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Figure 3.3: Example of performance fault. Step 1: set the breakpoint at
the third instruction of ioctl(). Step 2 (when breakpoint is reached):
execute the injection code. Step 3 (inside the injection code): execute sleep
command. Step 4: return to the normal execution of ioctl()
of which is 0x3f7b0cc647. To perform this injection, a breakpoint is set at
virtual address 0x3f7b0cc647 in all running qemu-kvm processes. However,
only the first three threads which reach the breakpoint will be subjected to
the 52 seconds delay. Figure 3.3 depicts the above example.
Due to the time constraint, we were able to develop this fault model for
KVM systems only.
3.2.4 Maintenance Fault
This fault model mimics the situation where a certain part (e.g. a CPU core
or a memory bank) of the hardware needs to be turned off for replacement
or power management.
3.2.4.1 Rationale
This fault model is intended to evaluate the maintainability and manageabil-
ity of the hypervisor. Modern system architecture and the current version
of the Linux kernel allow CPU hot-plugging [14] for online maintenance, up-
grading capacity on demand, and power saving [15] without affecting the
Reliability, Availability and Serviceability (RAS) of the system. It is impor-
tant that cloud components retain this feature of the base infrastructure.
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3.2.4.2 Implementation
Current implementation of Linux supports CPU hot-plugging, which is the
ability to turn a CPU core on and off dynamically. A user can change the
state of a CPU by modifying the value in /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuX/on-
line, which in turn invokes a kernel function that updates the CPU state. The
injector changes the target CPU state using the same kernel function. The
user first specifies the breakpoint location and the target CPU to be turned
on or off. The injector sets a breakpoint at the breakpoint location. When
the breakpoint location is reached, the injector calls the kernel function that
manages the CPU state, with the target CPU as a parameter, to change the
CPU state.
3.3 Experiment Setup
3.3.1 Selecting Fault Models
This section describes our selection of fault models for each component based
on the knowledge about the target systems.
3.3.1.1 KVM Virtualization System
• Guest system: We use the guest system misbehavior fault model to
verify whether the injected faults are contained in the targeted VM or
not.
• qemu-kvm: Since this multi-threaded process is responsible for multi-
plexing shared resources between VMs, we introduce performance fault
into this process to evaluate its resource sharing implementation. In ad-
dition, a set of soft errors is also used to validate the fail-stop assurance
of this user-mode component.
• KVM kernel module: We use soft errors to evaluate the robustness
and fail-stop assurance of this kernel module against random hardware
transient fault.
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• Linux kernel of the host system: Since this is the layer that directly
works with the hardware components, we apply the maintenance fault
here to evaluate the system’s maintainability, as well as to compare
the behavior of the guest system against the hardware configuration
changes.
3.3.1.2 XEN Virtualization System
• Guest system: fault injection results reported in [12] are used to
characterize the implication of errors that impact the guest system.
• qemu-dm and xenstored: these two user-level components provided
by XEN enable proper creation and control of guest systems. Soft
errors are injected in the two processes to evaluate the error impact on
the reliability of the XEN system.
• Linux kernel of Dom0: as Dom0 is able to manage the physical
hardware, we test it with the maintenance fault. In addition, to eval-
uate the criticality of Dom0 for the reliability of the XEN system, we
test the impact of Dom0 crashes.
• XEN hypervisor: fault injection results reported in [12] are used to
characterize the implication of errors that impact XEN hypervisor.
3.3.2 Testbed Setup
Figure 3.4 depicts the workload setup of the testbed, in which a KVM hyper-
visor hosts four VMs: three VMs run ApacheBench, a HTTP server bench-
marking tool, to intensively send HTTP requests to the Apache server run-
ning in the other VM. This KVM hypervisor and all four VMs are managed
by a virt-manager (which is not depicted in Figure 3.4) running in a separate
machine via an SSH connection.
The XEN-based testbed has the same configuration and executes the same
workloads as the KVM-based testbed described previously.
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Figure 3.4: A single testbed running four VMs (one VM running an
Apache server, and three VMs running the ApacheBench workload)
3.3.3 Pre-injection Analysis
Pre-injection analysis is performed to identify the triggering and injecting
locations within each component for each fault model. Since the injection
space is large, this is an important step to ensure the efficiency of each
injection: maximize the activation rate of the fault. As we want to evaluate
the system in the actual execution scenarios, the set of identified locations is
usually associated with a certain set of input or workload for the system.
3.3.3.1 Stress-Based Fault Injection
Stress-based fault injection [16] prioritizes the introduction of faults into the
most heavily used components of the target. We used Oprofile [17], a Linux
profiler that utilizes hardware performance counters, to accumulate statistical
information on how much time is spent by the program in each function This
information is used to identify the functions that are most often used by the
target program and thereby generate a fault injection campaign to target
these functions.
3.3.3.2 Path-Based Fault Injection
The idea of path-based fault injection [16] is to record the sequence of in-
structions executed by the target program under a certain input. Instead
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of using the technique presented in [16] to record the instruction sequence,
we used a Linux feature that allows reading the online status of the running
processes via /proc file system. For each running process, Linux generates
one /proc/PID/stat file (PID is the value of the process ID, e.g. 1010) con-
taining the status information of the specified process (by PID) at the time
the user reads its contents. One important piece of information this file pro-
vides is the current value in the current instruction pointer (EIP register) of
the process. Our script periodically reads this file to sample the locations on
the execution path of the target program. The injector uses these locations
as fault targets.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This chapter discusses the results and observations from the conducted fault
injection experiments. Table 4.1 summarizes these results.
4.1 Result of KVM-Based Cloud Experiment
Observation 1.1: In KVM, no fault propagation occurred from the
guest to host system during the four weeks experiment.
In contrast to [12], which found cases that the injected faults propagated
from the guest system to the host system in XEN hypervisor, we did not
find any similar case in the KVM hypervisor during a period of four weeks
(two machines x two weeks each) of continuously injecting faults. It could
be that we have not executed the test cases that uncover the potential bugs;
or it could be that the KVM hypervisor’s implementation does not have the
same defects as the tested XEN hypervisor.
When setting up fault injection in the guest kernel to generate the failures
in the VM, we realized that KVM does not allow the guest OS to modify the
content of debug registers of the VM. While the injector could successfully
read the value of any debug registers, its value remained unchanged when the
injector tried to write to those registers. This indicates that debug registers
are not fully implemented in KVM guest systems. In order to overcome this
problem, we modified the injector to directly inject the error to the memory
or register, without waiting for the triggering event. Therefore, we could not
count the number of activated faults in this experiment (this information is
missing in Table 4.1, in the guest misbehavior row), because this number
is the count of triggered faults when using the breakpoint-triggering mecha-
nism. However, this information is not important in this experiment because
its main purpose is to generate failures in the guest VM.
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Observation 1.2: In KVM, the kernel hangs when a CPU core is
turned on.
1 BUG: s o f t lockup − CPU#2 stuck for 10 s ! [ bash : 3 7 3 0 ]
2 Cal l Trace :
3 [< f f f f f f f f 8 8 2 9 3 c 7 c >] : kvm : hardware d i sab l e+0x0/0x25
4 [< f f f f f f f f 8 8 2 9 3 d 2 a >] : kvm : kvm cpu hotplug+0x7a/0x81
5 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 6 6 e a a >] n o t i f i e r c a l l c h a i n +0x20/0x32
6 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 a 3 b 6 9 >] cpu up+0xc0 /0xd0
7 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 a 3 b d 2 >] cpu up+0x59/0x6d
8 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 1 c 3 2 5 f >] s t o r e o n l i n e+0x43/0x67
9 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 1 0 a 7 5 d >] s y s f s w r i t e f i l e +0xb9/0 xe8
10 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 1 6 9 2 7 >] v f s w r i t e+0xce /0 x174
11 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 1 7 1 d f >] s y s w r i t e+0x45/0 x6e
12 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 5 d 2 8 d >] t r a c e s y s+0xd5/0 xe0
Listing 4.1: Kernel call trace printed after turning one CPU core on with
the KVM module loaded when no VM is running
1 BUG: s o f t lockup − CPU#2 stuck for 10 s ! [ qemu−kvm: 3 6 9 6 ]
2 Cal l Trace :
3 [< f f f f f f f f 8 8 2 7 1 d 6 4 >] : kvm inte l : v c p u c l e a r+0x0/0x80
4 [< f f f f f f f f 8 8 2 7 2 4 3 3 >] : kvm inte l : vmx vcpu load+0x2b/0 x132
5 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 8 f 9 1 9 >] p r e e m p t n o t i f i e r r e g i s t e r +0x81/0 xae
6 [< f f f f f f f f 8 8 2 a 4 3 d 2 >] : kvm : kvm arch vcpu load+0xe /0x17
7 [< f f f f f f f f 8 8 2 a 0 b f 8 >] : kvm : kvm vcpu block+0xb0/0 xc7
8 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 9 f 6 c 1 >] autoremove wake funct ion+0x0/0 x2e
9 [< f f f f f f f f 8 8 2 a 6 b 9 3 >] : kvm : kvm arch vcpu ioc t l run+0x418 /0
x61e
10 [< f f f f f f f f 8 8 2 a 2 0 e c >] : kvm : kvm vcpu ioct l+0xf2 /0 x448
11 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 8 b e 7 1 >] d e f a u l t w a k e f u n c t i o n+0x0/0 xe
12 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 4 2 0 a 5 >] d o i o c t l +0x21/0x6b
13 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 3 0 2 c e >] v f s i o c t l +0x457 /0x4b9
14 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 b 6 1 b 0 >] a u d i t s y s c a l l e n t r y+0x180 /0x1b3
15 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 4 c 7 6 6 >] s y s i o c t l +0x59/0x78
16 [< f f f f f f f f 8 0 0 5 d 2 8 d >] t r a c e s y s+0xd5/0 xe0
Listing 4.2: Kernel call trace printed after turning one CPU core on with
the KVM module loaded when one VM is running
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In the experiment, we observed that turning off a physical CPU core in
the hypervisor does not affect the availability of the running VMs and other
services. However, whenever we turned that CPU core on, the KVM kernel
module caused the whole host system to hang.
We also noticed that the host system hung even when there was no VM
running. However, when we unloaded the KVM kernel module from the host
system, we could successfully turn on and off any CPU core (except core 0).
Interestingly, when turning on one CPU core in the hypervisor that was
hosting no VM, the kernel message repeatedly printed the call trace showing
that KVM was hung in the kvm cpu hotplug() function (see Listing 4.1 and
Listing 4.2). The name of the function suggested that KVM kernel module
did consider this CPU hot-plugged situation; however, it did not perform
correctly in this corner case. The function might have not been tested thor-
oughly.
Observation 1.3: The Qemu-kvm process becomes a zombie, and
the management system based on libvirt hangs.
We injected bit-flip error to random registers in the qemu-kvm process.
In some cases, the bit-level error caused the qemu-kvm process to become a
zombie process (transition to defunct state); the management system hung
when querying the state of the VM corresponding to the defunct qemu-kvm
process.
We discovered that this occurred because of bugs in some API in libvirt
used by the virt-manager. That function does not return a value when the
target is a defunct VM. This is another corner case that appears not be tested
fully in libvirt.
Observation 1.4: The kernel crashes when performance faults are
injected into the qemu-kvm.
In this experiment, we used the path-based method to sample the break-
point addresses. The number of injected threads is randomly selected be-
tween 1 and 4, after which the delay time to inject the fault is also randomly
selected from 1 to 100 seconds.
Among 399 activated faults, we observed 16 faults causing the kernel to
crash during the experiment. This behavior is interesting because while the
faults were injected in user-level processes, they caused the kernel to crash.
In order to understand these kernel crashes, we set up another experiment
to inject the delay time into only one breakpoint location that crashed the
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Table 4.2: Performance Fault Experiments
Breakpoint
address
# In-
jected
threads
Delay
time
(s)
Duration
time (s)
Activated/
Injected
faults
# Ker-
nel
crashes
Sampled ad-
dresses
1-4 rand(100) rand(100) 399/400 16
One address
that crashes
the kernel
in the first
experiment
1-2 rand(100) rand(100) 80/80 0
Sampled ad-
dresses
3-4 rand(100) rand(100) 100/100 3
kernel in the previous experiment. The result of the experiment is shown
in Table 4.2. We did not observe any kernel crash when inserting a delay
in only 1 or 2 threads. However, we found three kernel crashes among 100
activated faults, which inserted delays in three or four threads.
Even though we did not determine the root cause of the crash, this symp-
tom is similar to one caused by a race condition error. The crash only
happens when the delay is inserted in multiple threads and the result is
non-deterministic, meaning that the crash occurs for a few injection actions
only.
4.2 Result of XEN-Based Cloud Experiment
Beside the two cases reported in [12] of error propagation from the guest VM
to the hypervisor, our experiments reveal the following additional problems
in XEN hypervisor and virt-manager:
Observation 2.1: Cannot turn on CPU in domUs.
In domUs, the CPU core can be turned OFF, but cannot be turned back
ON: the guest OS throws an error message while still operating normally. The
only way to bring the CPU back is to reboot the guest OS. This problem
could be due to the incomplete implementation of the virtual CPU in XEN.
Note that dom0 is able to handles these events correctly.
Observation 2.2: The qemu-dm crashes are not detected by virt-
manager automatically.
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When the qemu-dm process crashes or becomes a defunct state, virt-
manager loses track of the crashed VM – lists the VM as “no state” – until
the user manually executes a destroy command to force the release of this
VM. The “no state” state means that the virt-manager still considers the
crashed VM as an active one and hence, it does not allow VM restart.
Observation 2.3: Xenstored crashes cause the virt-manager man-
agement system to lose control.
Although crashing xenstored does not affect the availability of the cur-
rent running VMs, it causes the management system to lose control of the
whole hypervisor until the hypervisor is properly restarted. Changing xen-
stored from a statefull design to the stateless design might help to avoid this
problem.
4.3 Discussion
The use of the framework. Our experiment shows that the proposed
fault injection framework can be used for black box testing of the virtual-
ization system, since it does not require deep understanding of the target
system. Techniques such as path-based and stress-based fault injection can
automate the process of generating and executing the fault injection experi-
ment without requiring knowledge of the internal implementation/structure
of the program.
This is a starting point toward building a common reliability benchmark to
enable comparing between cloud implementations: the fault injection results
could be used to compare the error sensitivity between each implementation
against a certain set of fault models. This information could be a good
reference for the customers to consider when they select a specific cloud for
their application.
Virtual machine vs. bare metal machine. From our experience of
conducting debugger-based fault injection, hardware debug registers are fully
implemented in VMWare hypervisors. However, the guest misbehavior ex-
periment in KVM shows that hardware debug registers are not fully emulated
in guest systems. Besides, it is commonly known that some sensitive instruc-
tions do not function correctly in most virtualized systems (e.g. CPUID
instruction, performance counters). This behavior suggests that a virtu-
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alized system does not completely represent the bare metal system. VM
implementations are different across hypervisors. Therefore, a guest system
may behave differently in different virtualization environments, especially for
low-level system operations.
In addition to KVM’s lack of low-level debugging capability, our experi-
ments also point out that the CPU hot-plugging capability is not correctly
simulated in XEN’s guest system. Even though this problem is not likely
to affect the normal usability of XEN, a malicious user might exploit such
system-specific information leakage to access the XEN underlining virtualiza-
tion system of the cloud and exploit XEN vulnerabilities (e.g., bugs reported
in [12]) to crash the VMs of other users sharing the same hypervisor.
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CHAPTER 5
RELATED WORK
In order to motivate the demand for a sound assessment method for cloud
computing, we start our discussion by highlighting representative examples
of cloud outages. Next, we generalize the issues which are challenging cloud
providers in order to provide a higher level of availability for their services.
Finally, we present a survey of fault injection techniques and studies that are
relevant to the context of cloud computing.
5.1 Cloud Outages
These outages did not only affect the cloud availability, they also forced
cloud providers to make important design changes in the cloud infrastructure.
These are the valuable lessons for constructing the next generation of highly
available and secure clouds.
5.1.1 Microsoft Azure
During a routine operating system upgrade on March 13, 2009, the deploy-
ment service within Windows Azure began to slow down due to networking
issues. This caused a large number of servers to time out and fail.
Applications running only as a single instance (i.e., without replication)
shut down when the corresponding server went down. Very few applications
running multiple instances failed, although some were degraded due to one
instance being down. In addition, the ability to perform management tasks
from the web portal appeared unavailable for many applications due to the
Fabric Controller being loaded with work during the serialized recovery pro-
cess.
To prevent such occurrences in the future, Microsoft has been fixing the
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network issues. It is refining and tuning recovery algorithms to ensure han-
dling malfunctions quickly and gracefully. For continued availability during
upgrades, application owners are encouraged to deploy their application with
multiple instances. The second instance of an application is not counted
against quota limits to allow customers to run two instances of each appli-
cation.
5.1.2 Amazon S3
The 8-hour outage of Amazon services on July 20, 2008, was caused by a
single bit error in messages communicated (using a gossip protocol) between
the servers. In their postmortem analysis, some Amazon system engineers
determined that a handful of messages had a single bit corrupted in such a
way that the message remained intelligible, but the system information was
incorrect. MD5 checksums were used throughout the system to prevent, de-
tect, and recover from the corruption that can occur during receipt, storage,
and retrieval of objects from customers. However, the system did not have
the same protection to detect whether this internal state information had
been corrupted. Therefore, corruption was not detected when it occurred
and it spread throughout the system [3].
Amazon decided to add one more layer of checksum to protect the stored
internal state information.
5.1.3 Bitbucket
On October 3, 2009, BitBucket (https://bitbucket.org/) experienced 16+
hours of downtime due to two consecutive DDoS attacks targeted at the net-
work interfaces on Amazon EBS (Elastic Block Store) service for storage used
with EC2 instances. Such a problem could have been quickly resolved if the
incidents were promptly diagnosed given sufficient visibility to the network
traffic. The real issue is the multilevel administration of cloud services.
For BitBucket system administrators, the network traffic on the physical
servers is a black box. Consequently, the administrators cannot do anything
at the layers they cannot reach. The only solution is to rely on Amazon’s sup-
port. However, after six hours, even with urgent request tickets and phone
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calls, Amazon’s best advice was that EBS is a shared network resource and
therefore performance would vary. Only afterward did Amazon acknowl-
edge the problems with the service and work with BitBucket to resolve the
problem.
It was determined that BitBucket was under a massive-scale DDoS attack
using UDP packets. Amazon simply blocked the UDP traffic to resolve the
problem. On the next day, another DDoS using TCP packets targeted Bit-
Bucket. But this time it took only two hours for Amazon and BitBucket to
resolve the problem.
5.1.4 How Can Research Help?
Failure patterns similar to the S3 failure were observed in an error-injection-
based experimental analysis [18] of the Ensemble Group Communication Sys-
tem (GCS), a robust communication layer for distributed dependable appli-
cations. The study shows that about 5-6% of application failures are due to
an error escaping the GCS error-containment mechanism and manifesting as
silence data corruption. It is important to note that although the percent-
age of the observed silence data corruption is relatively small, such errors do
constitute an impediment to achieving high dependability because recovery
from these failures can involve significant system downtime.
Validation of such large-scale cloud computing deployments is always chal-
lenging, yet it is an interesting opportunity for the research community.
5.2 Dependability of Virtual Machines
The use of virtual machine (VM) based systems introduces the hypervisor
between the operating system and the hardware. The relationship between
the hypervisor, also called the virtual machine monitor (VMM), and the
guest operating system is analogous to the traditional relationship between
the operating system and the application processes running on it.
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5.2.1 Virtual Machine-Based Dependability Techniques
5.2.1.1 Fault and Failure Detection
VMs provide a software layer between OS and hardware and enable moni-
toring of the behavior of the guest system. Vigilant [19] is an initial effort
that applies machine learning to detect VM failures based on the correlation
of events generated by monitors at the hypervisor layer. Intrusion detection
systems (IDS) are moving toward out-of-host implementations, in which the
hypervisor layer becomes an attractive option [20].
Monitoring at the hypervisor layer enables failure/attack isolation and
hence, independent reporting of the observed incidents from the outside,
without the possibility of being corrupted/manipulated by the failing guest
system.
5.2.1.2 Recovery
Virtualization encapsulates each complete guest system into a virtual ma-
chine and provides a convenient way to capture snapshots of the system
state. Therefore, checkpoint and rollback are the primary recovery mecha-
nisms in virtualization environment. Table 5.1 lists the existing mechanisms
of VM checkpointing.
In the first category of VM checkpoint, the VM is stopped completely to
save its state in persistent storage, and then the VM resumes. This approach
incurs a large system downtime during the checkpoint.
In the second category (e.g., CEVM [21] and VNsnap [22]), VM live mi-
gration and copy-on-write are employed to create replica images of VMs with
low overhead. Then the image is written to disk in the background or by the
separate physical node. This disk-based VM checkpointing is not scalable, as
it stresses the storage system when many VM checkpoints need to be written
at the same time. In addition, the checkpoint is susceptible to corruption
due the low-frequency updating.
The last two categories are the high-frequency VM checkpointing based
on live migration (e.g., Remus [23]) and incremental checkpoint in main
memory (e.g., VM-µCheckpoint [24]). These checkpoint schemes cannot tol-
erate latent errors, since the checkpoint might contain dormant faults. A
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Table 5.1: Categories of Existing Mechanisms for VM Checkpointing
Mechanism Brief Description Comments
Stop-and-Save Stops a VM completely,
and saves its state to
persistent storage
• Large system downtime
• Provided by all major
VMM systems
Low-Freq (inter-
val >1h) based
on live migration
(e.g., CEVM,
VNsnap)
Creates a VM replica
on a remote node via
live migration, then the
remote node writes the
replica to disk
• Significant recomputation
during recovery, as check-
point frequency is low
• Large overhead (maintain
full replicas for a protected
VM)
High-Freq (inter-
val 10-1000 ms)
based on live mi-
gration (e.g., Re-
mus)
Maintains a VM replica
on a separate physical
node via live migration,
and fails-over upon a
failure
• Large overhead while mi-
grating latest updates to
the remote node continu-
ously (∼50% overhead for
50 ms checkpoint interval)
• Fail-stop assumption
High-Freq (in-
terval 10-1000
ms) based on
incremental
checkpoint-
ing (e.g., VM-
µCheckpoint)
Maintains high fre-
quency (intervals <1s)
incremental checkpoint
of dirty pages in main-
memory; recovers from
the stored checkpoint
in the same process
context
• Small overhead (6.3%
for SPEC06, 17.5% for
Apache)
• Reduced likelihood of
checkpoint corruption
• High recovery overhead
when suffering latent faults
(must recover from the
disk-based checkpoint)
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hierarchical architecture combining high-frequency, incremental checkpoint-
ing and low-frequency, disk-based checkpointing is proposed in [24]. This
approach reduces checkpointing corruption and performance overhead, but
it still achieves latent error tolerance.
5.2.2 Challenges of Using Virtualization in the Cloud
Although there has been substantial progress in improving VM checkpoint-
ing, it is still challenging to minimize checkpoint performance overhead,
checkpoint corruption, and checkpoint inconsistency in a seamless way in
the cloud infrastructure.
The non-uniform, dynamic geographic distribution of the nodes in the cur-
rent cloud-computing environment violates the assumptions of traditional
distributed systems regarding communication overhead. Legacy techniques
such as synchronous and asynchronous checkpointing already incur signifi-
cant overhead and cannot be applied naively in the new scenario without
investigation. Added to that are the high and nondeterministic costs that
result from the dynamic nature of the distributed system.
The major technical challenge in implementing monitoring and recovery
mechanisms at the hypervisor level is the semantic gap between the guest
system and the low-level hypervisor. The semantic gap prevents the hy-
pervisor from interpreting the behavior of the guest system from the set of
observable events and states at the hypervisor’s point of view. To address
this problem, virtual machine introspection techniques [25] have been intro-
duced. The current techniques use the knowledge of the internal structure of
the guest system to extract its behavior. For example, Linux kernels manage
processes by maintaining a list of task struct data structures, which can be
used to obtain the list of the running processes in the guest system.
The fundamental limitation of this approach is its dependence on the in-
variants of the guest system, mostly of the guest operating system. Therefore,
the implementation of this approach must be adjusted whenever the used in-
variants change. For example, the location and structure of the task struct
vary in different versions of the Linux kernel, so the introspection tools have
to be customized accordingly to operate correctly. In addition, significant
effort is often required to obtain the meaningful OS invariants. The devel-
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opers and maintainers of these tools need to have a deep understanding of
the internal implementation of the interested systems. Unfortunately, this is
almost impossible in case of a closed-sourced OS like any version of Windows
OS.
In order to motivate the demand for a sound assessment method for the
cloud, we start our discussion by highlighting representative examples of
cloud outages. These outages did not only affect the cloud availability, they
also forced cloud providers to make important design changes in the cloud
infrastructure. These are the valuable lessons for constructing the next gen-
eration of highly available and secure clouds.
5.3 Fault Injection for Cloud Computing
Fault injection techniques have been widely used to evaluate the dependabil-
ity of computer systems. Since both hardware and software are sources of
system failures [8], various fault injection tools [13, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]
are developed to support the evaluation of computing systems by injecting
software and hardware fault models.
Fault injection tools can be categorized into three types based on their
implementations on simulation, hardware, or software. A simulation-based
fault injection is conducted in early design stages on a simulation platform,
where the design is being tested. In order to evaluate a prototype of the
developed system, injection tools must be implemented in either hardware
or software (or both of the above [33]) of the target system. A hardware-
based tool, such as pin-level injection [34] or laser fault injection (LFI) [35],
often incurs high cost to build and exhibits inflexibility to use. The idea
of using software implemented fault injection (SWIFI) was originated in the
late 1980s with the introduction of FIAT [28], a tool that added functions to
test trigger conditions and inject faults at compile time. The SWIFI method
shows many advanced features over the hardware-based method, such as low
cost to build and operate, wide range of simulated faults, and flexibility to
control. Our CloudVal injection mechanism falls into the SWIFI category.
Fault injection has been adopted in the context of cloud computing due to
the increasing demand for high availability. Studies [36, 37] present PreFail
and Fate tools for efficient injection of failures into cloud software systems,
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such as HDFS. PreFail [36] provides a programmable failure abstraction,
which allows users to write policies to prune down large spaces of multiple-
failure combinations. Fate [37] is a framework for cloud recovery testing. Fate
specifically aims to solve the problem of massive combinatorial explosion of
failure scenarios by implementing a smart exploration strategy which prior-
itizes failure scenarios that result in distinct recovery actions. The idea of
Failure as a Service (FaaS) was generalized in [38] and [39]. Both studies aim
at developing general frameworks to perform failure drills on various compo-
nents of cloud infrastures, such as storage, network, and compute nodes. The
proposed failure models include node failures, message losses, and resource
exhaustion. The authors of [39] also present a case study on the impact of
injected failures on Hadoop applications.
Many fault injection experiments have been conducted to measure the
reliability of the OS [40, 41]. However, only a few systematically apply this
technique to evaluate the cloud virtualization environment. For example, M.
Le et al. in [12] study XEN hypervisors error behavior by injecting faults
to both the hypervisor and the guest system. This work reveals some bugs
in XEN’s implementation, which allows injected faults to propagate from
the guest system to the hypervisor. However, this experiment used only
hardware transient fault (or soft error) and had to modify the hypervisor to
inject fault to the guest VM.
In this study, we propose CloudVal, a fault injection framework for thor-
oughly evaluating the virtualization layer of cloud computing infrastruc-
tures.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
We have presented CloudVal, a fault injection framework that supports in-
jecting different types of fault models. The experiments demonstrate the use
of this framework in KVM and Xen virtualization systems (managed by a
virt-manager virtual machine manager) by using soft error, guest misbehav-
ior, performance fault, and maintenance fault models. The experiment results
show that the presented fault injection mechanism and design of fault mod-
els are a good starting point to develop a common benchmark for assessing
cloud virtualization infrastructures.
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